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1. Logic and Conversation 
Jeroen Groenendijk 
University of Amsterdam 
On the standard view, logic is concerned with reasoning, more in particular with 
fixing criteria for the soundness and validity of arguments .  If we apply standard 
logic in natural language semantics, we inherit this basic trait, and can only expect 
our logical semantics to have descriptive and explanatory value for the kind of 
linguistic phenomena that are related closely enough to what the logic is about. 
Reasoning is just one particular language game. And if we think of our 
daily conversations, it does not have the same central position it has in logic. Co­
operative information exchange seems a more prevailing linguistic activity. It is 
reasonable to assume that such a predominant function has a distinctive influence 
on the structure of natural language, which forms the subject matter of linguistics . 
For example, it is a widespread (and age-old) idea, that the organization of dis­
course is largely determined by a mostly implicit process of raising and resolving 
issues, and that even sentential structure, including the intonational contour of ut­
terances, can only be properly understood, if we take that to heart. If there is some 
truth in this, then linguistic semanticists should be worried by the fact that by and 
large they base themselves on a logical paradigm that is biased to such an extent 
towards reasoning rather than exchange of information . 
As a response to this fear, one might point out that Gricean pragmatics is 
as much part of an overall theory of meaning, as logical semantics is .  And the 
Cooperation Principle, which is at the heart of it, precisely is a principle of ration­
ality which governs information exchange. Grice proposed to use it in the expla­
nation of linguistic phenomena that lie beyond the reach of logical semantics as 
such. Among other things, he employed the principle in a defense of standard 
logic -in particular the truth functional analysis of the logical connectives­
against the allegation that it leaves important aspects of meaning unaccounted for. 
He argued that standard logic together with the general assumption that we follow 
the Cooperation Principle does provide us with the means to account for such ad­
ditional features of meaning. Hence, we are in no need to replace the standard 
logical analysis by some other type of interpretation, we only have to combine 
logical semantics with general pragmatic strategies to cover the relevant facts . 
One way to look at the logical investigations carried out in the present pa­
per, is to view them as an attempt to tum the Cooperation Principle as such into 
the key notion of logical semantics. Instead of centering the logic around the ex-
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plication of what makes a piece of reasoning into a sound and valid argumenta­
tion, we intend the logic to judge whether a conversation proceeds in accordance 
with the principles of cooperative information exchange. 
2. The Game of Logic 
In logic we use a simple picture of an argument. An argument is conceived of as a 
sequence of sentences, of which all but the last one are called the premises, and 
the last sentence is called the conclusion of the argument. One can look upon an 
argument as the proceedings of a language game. If the game is played according 
to the rules, then the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. 
If such is the game of logic, then the logical notion of validity arbitrates whether 
the game was played according to the rules. 
Argumentation is just one particular language game. For one thing, al­
though there may be spectators, it is a solitary game, whence we can leave the 
player out of the logical picture. The more typical case, at least from a linguistic 
perspective, are dialogue games, which involve exchange of information among 
two or more participants. If we generalize the picture of the game of argumenta­
tion sketched above, then we arrive at the following. 
A discourse is a sequence of utterances, the proceedings of a particular 
language game. The task of a logical analysis consists in providing us with logical 
notions which enable us to arbitrate the game, to characterize an utterance as a 
pertinent or impertinent move in the game. 
In this paper, we study a simple dialogue game from this perspective: 
Definition 1 .  (The Game of Interrogation) Interrogation is a game for two play­
ers : the interrogator and the witness. The rules of the game are as follows :  
A. The interrogator may only raise issues by asking the witness  non­
superfluous questions. 
B. The witness may only make credible non-redundant statements which ex­
clusively address the issues raised by the interrogator. 
The game of interrogation is a logical idealization of the process of cooperative 
information exchange, which makes stiff demands on the witness. The elements 
of the rules can be linked to elements of the Gricean Cooperation Principle : The 
requirement that the witness makes credible statements is related to the Maxim of 
Quality ; that the statements of the witness should be non-redundant, and the 
questions of the interrogator non-superfluous,  relates to the Maxim of Quantity ; 
and that the witness should exclusively address the issues raised by the interroga­
tor is a formulation of the Maxim of Relation. 
From a linguistic perspective, our interest does not lie in the game as such. 
The empirical success of the logic of interrogation depends on whether it can be 
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used in the explication of structural linguistic facts. We will give an illustration of 
that in Section 1 1  of the paper. 
3. The Tools of Interrogation 
Relative to a suitable language, and a semantic interpretation for that language, 
the logic of interrogation has to provide us with logical notions by means of 
which we can arbitrate the game. As a language for the game of interrogation, we 
use a simple query-language, a language of first order predicate logic enriched 
with simplex interrogatives : l 
Definition 2. (Query-Language) Let PL be a language of predicate logic. 
The Query Language QL is the smallest set such that: 
i .  If cP E PL, then cP E QL; 
ii. If cP E PL, ,I a sequence of n variables (0 � n), then ?,ICP E QL. 
In case the query-operator binds no variables, prefixing it to an indicative results 
in a yes/no-question. E.g. , ?3xPx asks whether there is an object which has the 
property P. If the query-operator binds a single variable, a single who-question 
results . E.g. ,  ?xPx asks which objects have the property P. When two variables are 
bound, as in ?xyRxy, we get a question asking for the denotation of a two-place 
relation, it asks for a specification of which pairs of objects stand in the relation R. 
So, in general, we interpret an interrogative ?xl " .xnCP as asking for a specification 
of the actual denotation of an n-place relation. 
We call the formulae of PL the indicatives, and the other formulae in QL 
the interrogatives of the language. We use <1>, '1', etc . ,  as meta-variables which 
range over all sentences . Adding an exclamation point, as in cp l, restricts the range 
to the indicatives, and adding a interrogative point, as in cp? , to the interrogatives 
of the language. We refer to a sequence of sentences <l>1 ; " ' ;CPn as (the proceedings 
of) an interrogation, and use 't to range over such (possibly empty) sequences. 
It is a convenient feature of the game of interrogation, that given the strict 
casting, we do not have to indicate who said what: interrogatives are uttered by 
the interrogator, indicatives by the witness. If the players were allowed to change 
roles, the proceedings of the game should include an indication of the source of 
each utterance. 
4. Partitioning Logical Space 
We state the semantics of the language in two steps. As our point of departure, we 
take a standard denotational semantics, and on top of that we define a notion of 
interpretation in terms of context change potentials .  
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As for the indicative part of the language, we assume a standard truth 
definition: I Icp ! l Iw,g E {O , l } , where w is an element of the set of possible worlds W 
(first order models), and g an assignment of an element of the domain D to the 
individual variables. We assume a single domain for all worlds . Furthermore, we 
assume that the individual constants (names) of the language are interpreted as 
rigid designators? 
For the interrogatives in the language, we employ a partition-semantics. 
We take the denotation of an interrogative in a world to be the set of worlds where 
the answers to the question are the same:3 
Definition 3. (Semantics o/ Questions) 
1 I ?.!cpl lw,g = { v E W I 'v'� E D
n: I Icpl lv,gW.iI = I Icpl lw,gWiI } ' 
Whereas an indicative cp ! selects a subset of the set of worlds : the worlds where 
cp ! is true, an interrogative cp? divides the set of worlds into a number of (mutually 
exclusive) alternatives. For example, the question ?3xPx divides the set of worlds 
into two alternatives : the alternative consisting of the worlds where some object 
has the property P, and the alternative consisting of the worlds where there is no 
such object in the domain. The question ?xPx divides the set of worlds in as many 
alternatives as there are possible denotations of the property P. And the question 
?xyRxy divides the set of worlds in as many alternatives as there are possible de­
notations of the relation R. 
The meaning of an interrogative corresponds to a partition of the set of 
possible worlds W. Hence, it also corresponds to an equivalence relation on W. It 
is the latter way of modeling a question that we will employ in formulating the 
context change potential of interrogatives. 
5. Structuring the Context 
In general, a semantics for a language in terms of context change potentials states 
the interpretation of a sentence as an operation on contexts . Hence, in order to 
formulate such a semantics for a particular language, we have to decide on a suit­
able notion of context. 
Our query-language consists of two different types of sentences, with dif­
ferent functions, and different effects on the context. The function of indicatives is 
to provide data, the function of interrogatives is to raise issues. So, we could look 
upon a context as consisting of two elements : data and issues.4 
We can model contextual data as a set of worlds, those worlds which are 
compatible with the data provided by the preceding discourse. Then, in general, 
the context change potential of an indicative will be to eliminate possible worlds. 
We can model contextual issues as an equivalence relation on the set of 
possible worlds. If two worlds are non-related, i .e . ,  if they belong to different 
contextual alternatives, then it is a contextual issue whether the actual world is 
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like the one or like the other. The differences between related worlds, i .e. , worlds 
which belong to the same alternative, is not a contextual issue. 
Since interrogatives raise issues, their context change potential is to dis­
connect certain worlds, creating new or more fine-grained contextual alternatives. 
The context change potential of an interrogative consists in eliminating pairs of 
worlds -without eliminating the worlds themselves from the data: interrogatives 
do not provide data, they only raise issues. 
Instead of splitting the context into two separate elements, a subset of the 
set of worlds representing the data, and an equivalence relation on the set of 
worlds representing the issues, we combine the two in modeling a context as an 
equivalence relation on a subset of the set of possible worlds. Or, equivalently :5 
-
Definition 4. (Structured Contexts) 
A context C is a symmetric and transitive relation on the set of possible worlds W. 
Two worlds are contextually related iff they both belong to the divided subset and 
to the same alternative. A world w belongs to the divided subset iff <w, w> E C, 
which by abuse of notation, we write as w E C. The set of contexts is partially or­
dered by c. The minimal context is W, the initial context of ignorance and indif­
ference, where no data have been provided, and no issue has been raised. The ab­
surd context, 0 ,  results if the contextual data are inconsistent. An indifferent 
context is a context such that 'v'w, v E C: <W, v> E C, a context where all worlds in 
the data are related, i .e. ,  a context where there are no (unresolved) issues. 
6. Changing the Context 
In defining the context change potentials of the formulae of our query-language, 
we restrict ourselves to the sentences ,  the closed formulae of QL. The definition 
uniformly interprets indicatives and interrogatives as functions from contexts to 
contexts, but they have a different kind of effect on the context: 
Definition 5. (Context Change Potentials) 
i .  C[<p ! ] = { <W, v> E C 1 1 I<p ! l Iw = 1 I<p ! l Iv = I } ;  
ii . C[ <p?] = { <W, v> E C 1 1 I<p?l Iw = I I<p?l Iv } ; 
iii. For 't = <PI ; · · · ;<Pn' C['t] = C[<pt l · · · [<Pn] · 
An indicative <p !  eliminates a pair of worlds from the context as soon as <p !  is false 
in one of the worlds of the pair. In effect, this means eliminating worlds from the 
contextual data. An interrogative <p? eliminates a pair of worlds (disconnects two 
worlds) if they belong to different alternatives ,  i .e . , if the two worlds differ in 
such a way that the question would receive a different answer in them. Interpret­
ing an interrogation, a sequence of a mix of interrogatives and indicatives ,  is just 
interpreting the sentences in the sequence one by one. 
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It can easily be checked that all context chan!e potentials in the language 
have the classical update property: 'v'C, <p: C[<p] c C. Further we note: 
Fact 1 .  (Indicatives and Interrogatives) 
a. 'v'C,w, v: <w, v> E C & w, v E C[<p ! ] => <W, V> E C[<p ! ] .  
b. 'v'C,w: W E  C => W E C[<p?] . 
Fact 1 b says that interrogatives cannot eliminate worlds from the data, they can 
only eliminate pairs of worlds, i .e. disconnect worlds, leaving both of them in the 
data as such. Fact l a  says that indicatives cannot disconnect worlds: if to worlds 
are connected in the data, then if both remain in the data, they remain connected.7 
Now that we have specified the logical language and its semantics ,  we 
tum to a specification of the logical notions by means of which we can arbitrate 
whether an interrogation is played according to the rules of the game. 
7. Consistency and Entailment 
One of the elements of the rules of the game of interrogation, the Maxim of Qual­
ity, is that the witness may only make credible statements. From a minimal , 
purely logical perspective, giving the witness every benefit of the doubt, her 
statements can be judged credible as long as she does not contradict herself. This 
requirement is covered by the logical notion of contextual consistency: 
Definition 6. (Consistency) <p is consistent with 't iff ::IC: q't] [<p] :t:. 0. 
A sentence <p is consistent with a preceding sequence 't, if there is at least some 
context C such that after an update of C with 't, a further update with <p does not 
lead to absurdity. 
Since interrogatives do not eliminate worlds from the data, but can at most 
disconnect worlds in the data (Fact 1 b) , as long as the context is not absurd, an 
interrogative will always be consistent with it. Hence, the Quality Maxim cannot 
fail to be obeyed by the interrogator, only the witness may fail to do so. 
Two other elements of the rules, both instances of the Maxim of Quantity, 
are that the witness may only make non-redundant statements, and that the inter­
rogator may only ask non-superfluous questions. From a minimal, purely logical 
perspective, a statement is redundant, and a question superfluous ,  in case it is al­
ready entailed by the preceding context: 
Definition 7. (Entailment) 't 1= <p iff 'v'C: C['t] = C['t] [<p] . 
A sentence <p is entailed by a preceding sequence 't, if after an update of a context 
C with 't, a further update with <p will never make a difference. 
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Contrary to what is the case in the game of reasoning, entailment is a vice 
rather than a virtue in the game of interrogation. Although defined in a uniform 
way, non-entailment means something different for indicatives and interrogatives: 
Fact 2. (Informativeness and Inquisitiveness) 
a 't I:t: <p I  iff 3C,w: W E  C['t] & w e: C['t] [<p ! ] . 
b. 't I:t: <p? iff 3C,w, v: <W,V> E C['t] & W,V E C['t] [<p] & <w, v> e: C['t] [<p?] . 
Indicatives, and only indicatives, can be informative, which means that at least in 
some context, some world is eliminated. Interrogatives, and only interrogatives, 
can be inquisitive, which means that at least in some context, some pair of worlds 
is disconnected. 
The notions of consistency and entailment are standard logical notions .  
New is at most that they indiscriminately apply to statements and questions,  and 
that we focus on the use of these notions in the formulation of Quality and Quan­
tity requirements for the cooperative exchange of information, instead of as crite­
ria for the soundness and validity of reasoning. 
In fact, the latter would only make sense for the indicative part of the lan­
guage. Which is not to say that, e.g. , <p? 1= 'I'?, or <p I  1= 'I'?, makes no sense. The 
latter means that 'I'? is a superfluous question to ask after having been told that <p I ,  
i .e . , that <p I  has already completely resolved the issue raised b y  'I'? It i s  not un­
usual to read this as : <p !  gives a complete answer to 'I'?, which is only a bit un­
natural given that in <p I  1= 'I'?, the answer precedes the question. However, when 
read in the other direction, 'I'? 1= <p I ,  the entailment only holds in case 1= <p I ,  which 
is only logical, given that questions provide no data. What <p? 1= 'I'? means is that 
the question 'I'? is superfluous after <p? has already been asked, which is the case 
if whenever the issue raised by <p? is resolved, the issue raised by 'I'? cannot fail to 
have been resolved as well . 
Although the familiar notions of contextual consistency and entailment 
have a minor role to play in the logic of interrogation as minimal requirements on 
the sensibility of utterances as moves in a game of information exchange, we have 
not yet touched upon the more central aspect, which is that information provided 
by the witness should be relevant to the issues that have been raised by the inter­
rogator. We tum to that heart of the matter now. 
8. Licensing and Pertinence 
The last element of the rules, the Maxim of Relation, is that the statements of the 
witness should exclusively address the issues raised by the interrogator. This re­
quirement is covered by the new logical notion of licensing: 
Definition 8. (Licensing) 
't licenses <p iff 'v'C, w, v : <w, v> E C['t] & W e: C['t] [<p] => v e:  C['t] [<p] . 
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A sentence is contextually licensed if whenever a world is eliminated from the 
data, all worlds related to it are eliminated as well, i .e . ,  the whole alternative to 
which the world belongs is eliminated. Licensing forbids the elimination of some 
world in some alternative, leaving some other world from the same alternative in 
the data. In eliminating some world, a sentence would be informative, but if it 
does not eliminate a whole alternative at the same time, the information provided 
does not exclusively address the contextual issues . The sentence would provide 
irrelevant information, information not directly related to the contextual issues.8 
Note that since interrogatives never eliminate any world from the data, 
they are trivially licensed. As was the case with consistency, licensing only puts 
constraints on the statements of the witness, but reckons any question from the 
interrogator to be relevant.9 Note also that if an indicative <p! is inconsistent with 't 
or is entailed by 't, then <p !  is trivially licensed by 'to 
Consistency and non-entailment are added to the requirement of licensing 
in the over-all notion of pertinence, the logical notion which arbitrates whether an 
interrogation is played according to the rules : 
Definition 9. (Pertinence) <p is pertinent after 't iff 
i .  <p is consistent with 't (Quality) 
ii . <p is not entailed by 't (Quantity) 
iii. <p is licensed after 't (Relation) 
As indicated, the three elements of logical pertinence can be related to the Gricean 
Conversational Maxims (leaving Manner out of consideration) which constitute 
the Cooperation Principle. But whereas the Gricean notions are usually thought of 
as belonging to a level of pragmatics which comes on top of logical semantics , 
here they make up the logic as such. In the logic of interrogation the notion of 
pertinence plays the same methodological role as the notion of entailment nor­
mally does.  Whereas the latter arbitrates the game of argumentation, the former 
arbitrates the game of interrogation. 
9. Putting Licensing to the Test 
Intuitively, a good criterion for logical relatedness of a sentence <p to the contex­
tual issues is the following: If <p gives any information in the context at all ,  then <p 
at least partially resolves the contextual issues. The latter is the case if at least one 
of the contextual alternatives is eliminated. to The notion of licensing meets this 
criterion: 
Fact 3. (Adequacy Test) 't licenses <p iff for all contexts C: 
If 3w: W E  C['t] & w e: C['t] [<p] , (if <p is informative in C['t] ,  
then 3w E C['t] : "tv: <W, v> E C['t] => v e: C['t] [<p] . 
then <p is resolvent in C['t] .) 
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. This says that 't licenses cp is materially the same as : for any context C, if cp is in­
formative in C after 't, then cp is resolvent in C after 'to I.e . ,  as soon as cp eliminates 
a world from the data, cp cannot fail to eliminate a contextual alternative. 
At first sight, this property may seem weaker than licensing. Relative to 
any particular context, a sentence cp can be informative and resolvent, in case next 
to eliminating some whole alternative, cp also eliminates some world in some 
other alternative without eliminating that alternative as a whole. However, if that 
were the case, then there would also be some other context where cp is informa­
tive, but not resolvent. It is by quantifying over all contexts, that being resolvent 
h . �. th 1 · · 1 1  w en lDlormatlve, amounts to e same as lcenslDg. 
That logical relatedness requires addressing contextual issues,  is most 
clearly indicated by the fact that an indicative cp is licensed iff the corresponding 
yes/no-question ?cp is contextually non-inquisitive: 
Fact 4. (Relatedness Test) Let cp be an indicative. 't licenses cp iff 't 1= ?cp. 
We refer to this fact as the Relatedness Test, because it gives a way of judging 
whether an indicative utterance is related to the contextual issues. If when cp is 
uttered, the corresponding question whether ?cp is inquisitive, this means that the 
question is new, and not already present. Hence, the utterance is not licensed by 
the issues that have already been raised (and are not yet resolved) in the context. 
Pertinence is a notion of contextual appropriateness, where the latter is 
usually taken to relate to presuppositions . Pertinence is a presuppositional notion: 
Fact 5. (Presupposition Test) -,cp is pertinent after 't iff cp is pertinent after 't. 
Putting the last two facts together, we can say that under the notion of pertinence, 
an indicative sentence presupposes the corresponding yes/no-question, in the 
sense that it should be non-inquisitive in the context, i .e. , it should be a contextual 
issue. In Section 1 1  we shall see, that taking the intonation contour of sentences 
into account, indicative sentences may also presuppose stronger who-questions.  
10. Pertinent Answers 
The new notion of licensing also gives rise to a new logical notion of an answer. 
An answer can be characterized as the special case of an indicative being licensed 
in the context of a single interrogative: 
Definition 10. (Answers) cp ! is an answer to 'I'? iff cp ! is licensed by 'I'? 
In Section 7 we noted that inconsistency and entailment imply relatedness .  Hence, 
tautologies and contradictions are borderline cases of trivial and absurd answers. 
Apart from absurd and trivial answers, which answer any question, there are two 
(non-equivalent) answers to yes/no-questions : 
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Fact 6. (YeslNo) cp is an answer to ?", iff 1= cp or I= ...,cp or cp <=> '" or cp <=> .",. 
Adding Quality and Quantity to the requirement of Relation, we arrive at the more 
informed notion of pertinent answers: 
Definition 11 .  (Pertinent Answers) 
cp !  is a pertinent answer to ",? iff cp !  is pertinent after ",? 
Being a pertinent answer just excludes absurd and trivial answers : 
Fact 7. (Pertinency and Contingency) 
cp is a pertinent answer to ",? iff cp is an answer to ",? & 1* cp & 1* ""cp. 
Only non-trivial questions (1* ",?) have pertinent answers, and only equivalents of 
yes and no, are pertinent answers to non-trivial yes/no-questions . As for single 
who-questions, such as ?xPx, an atomic sentence like Pa is a (pertinent) answer: 12 
Fact 8. (Literal Answers) Wilcp is an answer to ?,!cp . 
Given the presuppositional nature of licensing and pertinence, answerhood is pre­
served under negation: 
Fact 9. (Negative Answers) 
cp is a (pertinent) answer to ",? iff ...,cp is a (pertinent) answer to ",? 
Sentences which only state something about the cardinality of the set of objects 
that have the property P, are also answers to the question ?xPx. For example, 
3xPx and \/xPx are (pertinent) answers to ?xPx. 
The notion of an answer defined in terms of licensing differs from the 
standard notion of an answer in a partition theory of questions ,  which, as we 
mentioned in Section 7, can be formulated as cp !  1= ",? The standard notion is 
both less and more demanding than the one defined here in terms of licensing. 
The standard notion of an answer is less demanding in that it allows for 
over-informative answers, whereas the notion of answerhood in terms of licensing 
typically does not. Under the standard notion, if cp counts as an answer to ",?, then 
for arbitrary X, also cp 1\ X counts as an answer to ",? Under the present notion, it 
does so only if X as such, is also an answer to ",?: 
Fact 10. (Conjoined Answers) 
If cp is an answer to ",?, and X is an answer to ",?, then cp 1\ X is an answer to ",? 
Given that answerhood is also preserved under negation, other logical operations 
which can be defined in terms of negation and conjunction, like disjunction, also 
preserve answerhood. 
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The standard notion of an answer is more demanding in that it is a notion 
of exhaustive answering. E.g. ,  whereas under the present notion Pa A Pb counts 
as a (pertinent) answer to ?xPx, under the standard notion it does not. Only an ex­
plicitly exhaustive answer, like Pa A Pb A -,3x(Px A x '# a A x '# b), is an answer 
under the standard notion. Under the notion defined here, the explicitly exhaustive 
answer can be characterized as a better, a more informative answer: 1 3 
Definition 12. (Comparing Answers) Let <p and X be pertinent answers to ",? 
<p is a more informative answer to <p? than X iff <p 1= X and X 1'# <po 
In fact, the explicitly exhaustive answer counts as an optimal answer to the ques­
tion, in the sense that there are no pertinent answers to ?xPx which are more in­
formative. Note that: If '" is an optimal answer to <p?, then ", 1= <p? 
The focus of the present paper is not so much on the relation of answering 
as such, but rather on the more general issue of the role of the logical notions of 
licensing and pertinence in arbitrating the appropriateness of utterances from the 
perspective of cooperative information exchange. The following section is de­
voted to the discussion of some examples. 
11. An Illustration. And Nothing Else 
The examples given below are only intended as an illustration of, and partly as 
further motivation for, the logical notions introduced above, in particular the new 
notion of licensing. We make no claims to the effect that we present linguistic 
analyses, or provide alternative explanations as compared to other approaches . 
11 . 1 .  Resolving an Ambiguity with an Issue 
Consider the following example. Out of context, and without intonational infor­
mation, ( l a) is ambiguous between ( lb) and ( l c) : 14 
( l )  a. AIf rescued Bea. And no-one else. 
b .  Rab; · ..,3x(Rxb A X ;t: a) 
c .  Rab; ..,3x(Rax A x ;t:  b) 
However, after the interrogative in (2a) , or with the intonational information indi­
cated by underlining in (2a), the ambiguity in ( l a) is resolved: 
(2) a. (Who rescued Bea?) Alf rescued Bea. And no-one else. 
b .  ?xRxb; Rab; ..,3x(Rxb A X  ;t: a) 
c. ?xRxb; Rab; ..,3x(Rax A x ;t: b) 
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Only (2b) is a plausible interpretation for (2a) , and not (2c) .  Alternatively, after 
the interrogative in (3a) ,  or with the intonational information indicated by under­
lining in (3a) ,  (3a) can only be interpreted as (3c), and not as (3b) : 
(3) a. (Whom did Alf rescue?) Alf rescued Bea. And no-one else. 
b .  ?xRax; Rab; -13x(Rxb 1\ x ;c a) 
c .  ?xRax; Rab; -13x(Rax 1\ x ;c b) 
Our logic of interrogations accords with the difference between (2a) and (3a) .  
Both the interrogations (2b) and (3c) are pertinent. The interrogatives ?xRax and 
?xRxb are both inquisitive. And both the sequence of indicatives in (3b) and in 
(3c) are contingent. More importantly, Rab is licensed by (is an answer to) both 
?xRxb and ?xRax. And ...,3x(Rxb 1\ x ;c a) is licensed by ?xRxb; Rab, just as 
...,3x(Rax 1\ x ;c b) is licensed by ?xRax; Rab. 
Given that ?xRxb asks for the specification of the (whole) denotation of 
the property 'AxRxb, the answer that a has that property may leave the interrogator 
with the question whether anyone else does . And this is precisely the issue that 
...,3x(Rxb 1\ x ;c  a) addresses. We can also inspect this by performing the Related­
ness Test: the yes/no-question ?3x(Rxb 1\ x ;c a) is non-inquisitive after ?xRxb; 
Rxa. Hence, ...,3x(Rxb 1\ x ;c a) is contextually licensed, it is an issue the witness is 
entitled to address. 
But not the other way around: the sequences in (2c) and (3b) are imperti­
nent. The sentence ...,3x(Rax 1\ X ;c  b) is not licensed by ?xRxb; Rab. And the sen­
tence ...,3x(Rxb 1\ X ;c  a) is not licensed by ?xRax; Rab. That Alf rescued no-one 
else but Bea, can be informative in a state in which the question has been raised 
who rescued Bea, without being resolvent after the answer has been given that Alf 
rescued Bea, and hence, is not licensed by the context. 
A simple counterexample against licensing, is the situation where the in­
terrogator already knows that one and only one person rescued Bea. She wants to 
know who it was .  After her question to that effect, and having been told by the 
witness that it was Alf, the state of the interrogator is a state of indifference. Still , 
that Alf rescued no-one else, can very well be informative in her state. Only she 
did not ask for that. That Alf rescued no-one else does not resolve a contextual 
issue. Such a counterexample shows that the last sentence of (2c) is not licensed 
by the context, which makes it impertinent. 
Again, we can also put the Relatedness Test to work: the yes/no-question 
?3x(Rax 1\ x ;c b) is inquisitive after ?xRxb; Rab. This means that ...,3x(Rax 1\ 
x ;c b) is not licensed by the context. In the context of ?xRxb; Rab, it addresses an 
issue which was not raised by that context. 
What the discussion of these examples suggests is the following. One way 
of accounting for the resolution of the ambiguity in ( l a) ,  in the contexts (2a) and 
(3a) ,  is that we cooperatively interpret (2a) and (3a) in such a way that our inter­
pretation gives rise to a pertinent discourse, where each sentence is licensed by 
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the preceding context. That is how we arrive at (2b) and (3c), and not at (2c) and 
(3b) as appropriate interpretations for (2a) and (3a) .  
11 .2. Presupposing an Issue 
If we swap the interrogatives in (2a) and (3a) ,  leaving the intonational contour of 
the utterances the same, the resulting interrogations are not appropriate, e .g . ,  
compare (2a) with (4a) : 
(4) a. *Whom did Alf rescue? Alf rescued Bea. And no-one else. 
b. ?xRax; « ?xRxb» Rab; -,3x(Rxb /\ x *" a) 
The intuition is that with the intonation contour as indicated in (4a) , the first in­
dicative simply does not fit the interrogative. It fits the interrogative we originally 
had in (2a), not this one in (4a) . A natural conclusion to draw is that the intonation 
contour as such has some semantic impact, because otherwise, we are (semanti­
cally) out of business in explaining what is wrong with (4a) . 
Along not unusual lines, we might account for the un acceptability of (4a) , 
in a presuppositional setting, by assuming that the intonation contour of the first 
indicatives in (2a) and (3a) ,  presuppose the issue raised by the interrogatives in 
(2a) and (3a) .  We can look upon the sequences in (2b-c) and (3b-c) as the result of 
presupposition accommodation. In (4b), I indicated that by fronting the first utter­
ance of the witness, with the corresponding presupposed question between double 
1 5 angled brackets . 
Now we are back in business . If anything may be assumed, then it is that, 
leaving accommodation aside, if a question is presupposed, it is to be non­
inquisitive in the context. Just as , leaving accommodation aside, a presupposed 
indicative should be non-informative in the context. Then we are quickly ready 
with explaining what is wrong with (4a) : ?xRxb is inquisitive after ?xRax, the un­
acceptability of (4a) is due to presupposition failure. 
A general feature of presuppositions is that they are preserved under ne­
gation. As we noted above, contextual relatedness is of a presuppositional nature. 
An utterance of an indicative q> always presupposes the corresponding yeslno­
question. Returning to the type of examples we are discussing here, where we 
take intonational contour into consideration, if we think along these presupposi­
tional lines, then we can represent (3a) out of context, but with the intonation 
contour as indicated in (5a) ,  as (5b) : 
(5) a. Alf rescued Bea. And no-one else. 
b. « ?xRxb» Rab; -,3x(Rxb /\ x *" a) 
Just concentrating on the first sentence, we see that as compared to the general 
presupposition of indicatives we just noted, that q> presupposes the yeslno­
question ?q>, the effect of the intonation contour in the first sentence of (5a) ,  ac-
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cording to the representation in (5b) , leads to a stronger presupposed who­
question. The stronger presupposition is also preserved under negation: 
(6) a. Alf did not rescue Bea. And, also, no-one else. 
b .  « ?xRxb» ...,Rab; ...,3x(Rxb 1\ x � a) 
Observe that if we consider the first sentence in (6) with a neutral intonation con­
tour, we get back the same kind of ambiguity we found in ( l a) ,  where the second 
reading is the only one which (7a) has : 
(7) a. Alf did not rescue Bea. And, also, no-one else. 
b. « ?xRax» ...,Rab; ...,3x(Rax 1\ x � b) 
Next to preservation under negation, the possibility to be cancelled is another 
characteristic feature of presuppositional phenomena. Compare (2a) with (8a) :  
(8) a. (Who rescued Bea?) AIf rescued Bea. And, actually, no-one else. 
b. ??(Who rescued Bea?) Alf rescued Bea. And he rescued no-one else. 
Unlike in (2a) , in (8a) the ambiguity of ( l a) turns up again. Actually, I tend to be­
lieve that for (8a) the reading in (2c), which was excluded for (2a) , is more salient 
than the reading in (2b), the only acceptable reading of (2a) .  The word actually 
crucially seems to give rise to the availability of both readings . Apparently, the 
conversational effect of actually, is an indication of the fact that the issue at hand 
is being overruled. 
Unlike in the artificial language game of interrogation, in real discourse 
we may invent the issues we want to address ourselves .  As (8a) shows,  although 
we are not asked for that, we may provide the additional piece of information that 
rescuing Bea was Alf' s only heroic act. Does this get in the way of the role of our 
strict notion of relatedness in steering discourse, and determining its appropriate­
ness? I don' t  think so. The relevant observation is, that if one overrules related­
ness to a contextually given issue, and addresses a new issue, as happens in (8a) ,  
then one explicitly marks one' s utterance for having this effect. If  relatedness did 
not operate, there would be no need for that. So, my hypothesis is, that (8b) is not 
an appropriate sequence, that is, unless one way or the other, for example, by 
adding special intonation contour to the utterance (Ahaand! . . .  ), the utterance is 
marked for providing extra unsolicited information 
11 .3. How Accommodating Can One Get? 
The two sentence sequence in (9a) is just as alright as the three sentence sequence 
in (2a) ; and from the unavailability of the reading (2c) for (2a) , we may expect 
that ( lOa) is hardly acceptable: 
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(9) a. Who rescued Bea? Only Alf rescued Bea. 
b .  ?xRxb; Rab 1\ -,3x(Rxb 1\ x # a) 
( 1 0) a. ??Who rescued Bea? Alf rescued only Bea. 
b. ?xRxb; Rab 1\ -dx(Rax 1\ x # b) 
The following examples also give an illustration of that: 
( 1 1 )  Did Alf rescue Bea? Yes he did. And, in fact, he rescued only Bea. 
( 1 2) ??Did Alf rescue Bea? Alf rescued only Bea. 
The last two sentences of ( 1 1 ) , and the last sentence in ( 1 2) provide the same in­
formation. Still, the discourse in ( 1 1 ) , where we first just resolve the issue raised 
by the interrogative, and then go on to provide some extra information that is not 
asked for as such, is alright. But if we make the answer as such over-informative, 
as in ( 1 2) ,  by putting the extra information already in it, the acceptability of the 
resulting discourse is questionable. 
Although the examples discussed above support the idea that the strict no­
tion of contextual relatedness embodied in the notion of licensing is operative in a 
structural way,  it is hard to believe that just being a bit over-informative is always 
punished so harshly. The following example is a case in point: 
( 1 3) a. Did someone rescue Bea? AIf rescued Bea. 
b .  ?3xRxb; Rab 
The indicative in ( 1 3) ,  is impertinent after the yes/no-question. Only 3xRxb and 
-dxRxb are pertinent in the context of the question ?3xRxb. The sentence Rab 
properly entails 3xRxb, and hence counts as over-informative. However, intui­
tively, the information that Rab is such a natural elaboration of 3xRxb, anticipat­
ing the further question: Who ?, that it seems wrong to deem it impertinent in the 
context. Rather than blaming her for being uncooperative, the witness deserves 
praise for her accommodating attitude. 
Note, first of all ,  that the indicative in ( 1 3a) really needs the intonation 
contour indicated in ( 14a) : 
( 14) a. Did someone rescue Bea? AIf rescued Bea. 
b. ?3xRxb; « ?xRxb» Rab 
In line with the observations made above, this means that the indicative presup­
poses the issue who rescued Bea, and should be represented as in ( 1 4b), and not 
as in ( 1 3b) . However, this does not yet explain why the sequence feels alright. 
The issue ?xRxb is not implied by ?3xRxb, but rather the other way around: ?xRxb 
1= ?3xRxb. The issue presupposed by the indicative in ( 1 4) ,  is stronger than the 
issue posed by the question, and hence is inquisitive in the context. 
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Note, secondly, that although it is perhaps a more standard way to react to 
the question, it seems not really obligatory, to first say :  Yes, as in ( 1 5a) :  
( 1 5) a. Did someone rescue Bea? Yes, Alf rescued Bea. 
b. ?3xRXb; 3xRXb; « ?xRXb» Rab 
If this were the case, we would arrive at ( 1 5b) , and the present examples would fit 
in with the observation made above, that providing extra information is allowed 
only after the contextual issue has been resolved. 
However, if, as I assume, ( 1 4a) as such is fully appropriate, then, as it 
stands ,  the logic of interrogation does not give us the means to account for this .  
One way to approach the matter might be to add a notion of contextual relatedness. 
for questions, which explains why the issue presupposed by the last utterance in 
( 14a) is so closely related to the opening yes/no-question, that its accommodation 
takes no effort. 
Another way to address this issue might be to interpret the effect of focus­
sing in the indicative utterance in ( 14a) in such a way, that it involves existential 
quantification, and amounts to the same thing as we find in ( 1 5b) . But further in­
vestigations along these lines have to be left to another occasion. 
12. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigated the prospects of basing logic on cooperative infor­
mation exchange instead of valid reasoning. To this end, we introduced a simple 
dialogue game of interrogation. Relative to a minimal logical query-language 
suitable for the game, and a semantic interpretation for that language in tenns of 
context change potentials, we defined a logical notion of pertinence, which en­
ables us to arbitrate whether the game is played according to the rules . The ele­
ments of pertinence -contextual consistency, non-entailment, and licensing­
were seen to correspond to elements of the Gricean Cooperation Principle . The 
main novelty is the notion of licensing, by which we can judge whether an utter­
ance is logically related to the context. We illustrated the use of the logic of inter­
rogation in natural language semantics by considering some linguistic examples, 
which exhibit phenomena which are inherently related to the communicative 
function of language. 
We hope to have shown that a reorientation of logic towards raising and 
resolving issues is a feasible enterprise, which is interesting both from a logical 
and from a linguistic perspective. It leads to a new notion of meaning as cognitive 
content, which treats data and issues as equal citizens .  In doing so, logical seman­
tics invades the territory of pragmatics.  Instead of viewing semantics and prag­
matics as constituting two separate components within a theory of meaning, we 
make a move towards an integrated theory by shifting the logical perspective from 
valid argumentation to cooperative communication. 
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Notes 
1 .  For more discussion about the language and its interpretation, see Groenendijk 
& Stokhof ( 1996), in  particular Section 4.  
2.  These are not very natural assumptions to make in an epistemic setting.  See 
Aloni ( 1999) for a discussion of the issue, and an analysis which makes it possible 
to lift these assumptions. 
3 .  See Groenendijk & Stokhof ( 1 984, 1996) for extensive discussion of the parti­
tion semantics for interrogatives. 
4.  The terminology is taken from Hulstijn ( 1 997), who defines an update seman­
tics for questions in a similar way. 
5 .  What is used here as the notion of context, a symmetric and transitive relation 
on the set of possible worlds, could also be taken as a notion of semantic content, 
replacing the usual notion of a proposition as a set (property) of possible worlds . 
The content of any sentence can then be taken to consist of a (possibly empty) 
assertive part, and a (possibly empty) interrogative part. The content of a sentence 
can be a mix of asserting/presupposing data and raising/supposing issues. 
6 .  This is why in the title of the paper it says:  Classical Version. Originally, the 
logic of interrogations presented here was designed in a non-classical ,  dynamic 
setting, which lacks the classical update property. The richer system, also allow­
ing for anaphoric relations across utterances, will be discussed in another paper. 
See also Groenendijk ( 1 998). 
7 .  This fact about the complete division of labor between indicatives and inter­
rogatives is specific for the language at hand, and not a necessary feature. Mixed 
cases of sentences which both provide/presuppose data and issues can be accom­
modated without difficulty. 
8 .  In Jager ( 1 995), a similar relevance notion can be found, but baked right into 
the semantics as such, and not as a logical notion which comes on top of the se­
mantics to arbitrate appropriateness. 
9 .  This is a feature particular to the present set-up. One could add requirements 
of relatedness for the questions of the interrogator as well . 
1 0. The notion of resolution, defined as eliminating at least one alternative, is the 
usual notion of a giving a partial answer in a partition semantics for questions ,  
next to the notion of a giving a complete answer, defined as 'II 1= </>? Unlike the 
notion of an answer defined in the next section, both notions have in common that 
they allow for over-informative answers . The main feature of the present ap­
proach is that it starts out from precisely forbidding that. 
1 1 . There is no space to go into this here, but there is also an important difference 
between the notion of licensing and the notion of being resolvent when informa­
tive. Unlike the latter notion, licensing is grounded. By this we mean that being 
licensed is the same as being licensed in the initial context of ignorance and indif­
ference, updated with whatever went on in the discourse. The notions of consis-
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tency and non-entailment are grounded as well, which means that pertinence is 
also a grounded notion. So, in calculating pertinence one only has to reckon with 
one single minimal context. Whatever counts as appropriate there, is appropriate 
per se. 
12 .  This feature makes it possible to link the logically elegant partition view of 
questions with a notion of answers that meets linguistic intuitions .  In Groenendijk 
& Stokhof ( 1 984) and elsewhere, we argued at length on logical grounds against 
Hamblin's and Karttunen's semantic analyses of questions. Nevertheless ,  almost 
without exception, linguistic semanticists fall back on these analyses, because 
they dislike the notion of exhaustive answers that seems to be baked into the par­
tition view. Under the present notion of an answer, linguists can have their cake 
and eat it. 
1 3 .  Precisely because the notion of licensing forbids over-informativeness, we 
obtain this easy way of comparing answers in terms of informativeness . Compare 
this with the much more intricate notions of comparing answers in Groenendijk & 
Stokhof ( 1984, 1 996) . 
14 .  English is not the perfect language for this type of example, because of the 
easy availability of do-support. Lacking do-support, Dutch would be better. 
15 .  This is only a bit of suggestive notation. The semantics presented in Section 6 
does not take presuppositions into account. If it did, it would declare C[ <<<p» 'II] 
= C['II] ,  if C[<p] :F- C, else undefined. Note that indicative and interrogative pre­
suppositions are uniformly dealt with in this way. 
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